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Industries globally produced 50% of total CO₂ emissions in 2018, largely contributing to current 
climate changes. The efficiency of environmental policies is crucial for reaching necessary 
abatement goals. The EU ETS policy covers the most emission intensive industries, whereas it is 
imperative to repeatedly evaluate the policy efficiency. There is yet no consensus whether the price 
of EU ETS CO₂ allowances affects the emissions. Using a panel data regression analysis, this thesis 
examined the effect of the EU ETS allowance price on emissions of various Swedish industries. 
Overall, the results showed all independent variables to be statistically significant. The model 
estimated that a 1% increase in price is associated with a 12,73% decrease in emissions. However, 
the model contains certain limitations which may have caused biased results, hence the results 
should be interpreted with caution. The graphical analysis showed indications that all sectors except 
Iron & Steel has decreased their overall emissions and become more environmentally friendly due 
to the EU ETS carbon price. From these results, the study concludes that the allowance price of the 
EU ETS has a significant negative effect on the emissions of Swedish industries. It also concludes 
that the efficiency of the policy seems to vary among the different sectors, thus sector-specific 
adjustments of the policy may be relevant to optimize the overall efficiency of the policy. 
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The world faces an existential crisis in climate change (UNFCCC 2021). The 
emissions caused by humanity are currently exceeding the planet’s ability of 
storage and preservation. According to the Emissions Gap Report 2020 the average 
fossil CO₂ emissions has increased with 1,3% each year during the period 2010-
2019. This causes a surging surplus of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
contributing to increasing temperatures as the greenhouse effect rises. This has fatal 
effects on nature, not only constraining biological resources and harming the 
biodiversity, but also causing natural disasters such as extreme weathers, floods, 
and wildfires (Mirza 2003). To prevent escalating consequences, a global 
agreement is established to attain protection of the planet, known as the Paris-
agreement. This alignment puts pressure on all participating countries to reach set 
emission-abatement goals to keep the global average temperature below 1,5 degrees 
Celsius. Several policies are applied in European economies to reach environmental 
goals, one of them being the EU ETS, a cap-and-trade policy covering energy 
intensive industrial and manufacturing producers. The energy sector and the 
industrial sector combined caused 50% of the total emissions from EU-27 countries 
in 2018 (EEA 2021). Due to the urgency of sustainable industrial production, this 






Figure 1 Trends of total emissions of Swedish EU ETS industries and allowance-prices. 
Source: Own processing 2021. Based on data from EEA 2021, Ember 2021. 
 
The last few years the prices in the EU ETS allowance-market have shown a rapid 
increase, simultaneously as the emitted CO₂ from Swedish EU ETS industries has 
decreased, depicted in Figure 1. This provides reasons to evaluate how the changes 
of allowance prices are affecting CO₂ emissions from Swedish industries. 
Therefore, this thesis will carry out a policy analysis evaluating the effect of the 
allowance price on CO₂ emissions of EU ETS industries in Sweden. This will be 
done through a panel regression analysis which will include independent variables 
of allowance price and production, with the EU ETS emissions as dependent 
variable. The estimated coefficients of the variables will indicate how much a 
marginal change of the EU ETS allowance price changes the emissions.  
 
The different industry sectors in Sweden are contributing with different multitudes 
to the total emissions (EEA 2021). The various sectors have also shown dissimilar 
trends in their year-by-year emissions the last few years. The occurrence of these 
differences could be an indicator that the various sectors are differently affected by 
the EU ETS allowance price. To reach a more sustainable industrial production, 
without altering the economic growth, the amount of emissions per produced output 
level needs to be lowered (Gillingham et al. 2009). In this thesis, the amount of 
emissions related to the industrial production output is considered as the emission 
intensity. This study will through a graphical analysis evaluate whether there are 
sector-specific differences in patterns of emissions and such emission intensities, 
and if these changes are due to the EU ETS allowance price. An assessment of how 












































in policy efficiency among sectors. This understanding could be valuable for 
policymakers when making sector-specific adjustments to reach an overall increase 
in policy efficiency. 
1.1. Background 
The EU has for the past 30 years aimed towards increasing the sustainability of 
consumption and production, using emission-abatement policies (European Union 
2016). A recent report from CPLC (2017) shows that carbon pricing is an efficient, 
adaptable, and low-cost method to reduce greenhouse gases. The actuality of more 
frequent usage of carbon pricing harmonizes with these beliefs of effectiveness. 
Currently there are 31 emission trading schemes and 30 carbon taxes in the world 
which covers 22 percent of the total global emissions (World bank 2020).   
 
The EU ETS was introduced in 2005 and is a cap-and-trade policy using emission 
permits to achieve emission reductions (EEA 2020). This policy constitutes a 
solution for emission reductions by using market-based instruments. This consists 
of supplied emission permits that European nations and their producers can trade if 
needed. Those firms emitting more than their level of permits can through the 
allowance market purchase more allowances to meet their individual needs, if not, 
heavy fines will be imposed. The firms using less permits can sell or reserve them 
for future use (ibid). This implies that the market creates additional gains for those 
firms who has low emission intensity in their productions. Given that the numbers 
of permits in the market are constrained, an indirect price is put on carbon emissions 
and by that works in similar ways as a carbon tax. As Hepburn (2006) is stating 
there is a simple but essential symmetry between control of quantities and prices. 
When using a quantity instrument, regardless of using a command-and-control 
regulation or by market creation, it always entails a related indirect price. Carbon 
taxes and the emission allowance schemes differ in several aspects (Green 2021). 
The carbon tax is a policy which includes a surcharge placed on energy or fuel use. 
This gives a certainty of cost as the price is set by the government of each country. 
In that sense there is no actual limit of the quantity of emissions, provided that the 
parties concerned are able and willing to pay the additional cost of the tax. In 
contrast, the ETS provide a certainty of quantity. This is set by the emission cap 
determined by deciding governments and establishes the upper limit of released 
greenhouse gases (ibid). As participating firms take part of a market, the price of 
allowances is affected and determined by the current supply and demand, creating 
daily spot-prices for allowances. It should be noted that the differences of the two 
policies are sometimes vague, since the ETS can hold a price floor which then gives 




The EU ETS covers following industries: Electricity and heat generation, oil 
refineries, steel works, production of iron, aluminum, metals, cement, lime, glass, 
ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids, bulk organic chemicals, and commercial 
aviation within the European Economic Area (EEA 2020).  
 
The EU ETS has gone through different reforms through time, divided in the four 
time periods of 2005-2007, 2008-2012, 2013-2020, and 2021-2030 (European 
Commission 2015). The first phase was to be considered a pilot trial period, which 
was applied to test carbon-market prices and establishing necessary infrastructure 
for reporting, monitoring, and verifying emissions. Almost all allowances were 
allocated for free, and the caps were decided based on historic emissions, a practice 
called grandfathering. The second phase, 2008-2012, was used to refine the policy 
to make it more efficient. The EU imposed a tighter cap which reduced the total 
volume of allowances by 6,5% compared to 2005. In this phase the permits were 
generally no longer granted for free, more member states joined the EU ETS, and 
more types of greenhouse gases was included within the scope of the policy. The 
third phase of the EU ETS, 2013-2020, involved further modifications for several 
reasons. For example, the policy did not create such significant changes or 
progresses regarding renewable energy and low carbon technologies as was first 
anticipated. It also was not as cost-effective as first estimated. The allocation system 
was by that transformed from grandfathering to an auctioning principle. The 
auctioning platforms was made more transparent and accessible to any participating 
country of the EU ETS, to ensure openness and to be harmonized without 
discriminatory manners (ibid). 
1.2. Aim, Research Question and Delimitations 
This thesis aims to assess the effect of the EU ETS on emissions of Swedish 
industry sectors. 
  
The project seeks to answer following question: How has the EU ETS allowance-
price affected the emissions of Swedish industries? 
 
The study contains certain limitations due to a constrained timeframe. Previous 
work is using a variety of methodologies when performing policy-evaluation, many 
of them being highly extensive, which is not within the scope of this analysis. This 
study is approaching the objective of the study merely by focusing on the price-
effect of allowances. Another limitation is that the project only assesses the second 
and third trading-periods of the EU ETS, years 2008-2020. This is due to the 
grandfathered policy construction of phase 1 where the market effects were not 
considerable and therefore not of significance in this study. Furthermore, the study 
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is limited to 6 industrial sectors: Refineries, Iron & steel, Non-metallic minerals, 
Pulp & Paper, Chemicals, and Electricity & Other combustion. The specific 
subsectors Primary aluminum, Non-ferrous metals, Nitric acid, and Bulk chemicals 
has been excluded from the dataset due to lack of complete data. Additionally, the 
study is limited to Swedish industrial production only, which is done with respect 
to the time-scope of the project, to find and prepare matching panel data for more 
than one variable.  
1.3. Structure  
The thesis is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of relevant literature 
of previous research. Section 3 describes the chosen method with the theoretical 
framework, data description, assumptions, and a presentation of the economic 
model. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the study. This is followed by a 
discussion in section 5 and brief conclusions in section 6.  
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The previous literature has repeatedly assessed the influence of the EU ETS policy. 
Several methods have been applied and many viewpoints have been taken when 
evaluating the impact of the EU ETS on different industries and their emissions, 
resulting in different outcomes. There is a wide range of studies and models, many 
of them including other considerations in addition to assessing emission reductions, 
and sometimes even excluding the aspect of emissions. However, some of them are 
focusing on the effect of carbon pricing on emissions. Bayer and Aklin (2020) 
investigates the EU ETS carbon price’s efficiency to reduce emissions. They argue 
that, despite low prices, the carbon markets can help reduce emissions. They use a 
statistical model with panel data, finding that the EU ETS have prevented more than 
1 billion tons of emitted CO₂ in years 2008-2016. This quantity corresponds to 3.8% 
reductions of total EU-wide emissions compared to not applying the EU ETS in 
Europe. They claim that the price of carbon is not the only driving force of emission 
reductions, and that the policy is generally effective also during times of low carbon 
prices. Other studies also investigate whether carbon prices are a main driving force 
in emission reductions. For example, Haites (2018) studies the performance of 
carbon pricing policies with regards to emission abatements and cost effectiveness. 
He finds that carbon taxes overall in Europe has made reductions up to 6,5% over 
several years, he also notes that within countries where the EU ETS takes part the 
reduction moves more quickly than those with only a carbon tax. Another study 
focusing on possible factors influencing cap-and-trade policies’ impact on 
emissions is Murray and Maniloff (2015). They use econometric models to quantify 
the emission reductions caused by the policy and reductions caused by other factors, 
such as additional environmental programs, recession and lowered natural gas 
prices. The result of their analysis shows that the emissions would have been 24% 
higher without the program, supporting that the policy is being efficient. They also 
argue that the emission reductions may have been due to institutional factors and 
not only to the permit price itself.  
 
In a review of numerous ex-post analyses of the EU ETS and carbon pricing, Green 
(2021) reflects that the general results of the studies are that the prices of carbon 
are not high enough to cause significant decreases in emissions. She also concludes 
that for such a comprehensive policy there is seemingly little knowledge about its 
2. Literature review 
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ex-post performance and emphasizes the need for more empirical work to assess 
the effect of carbon pricing on emission reductions. Many studies are assessing the 
first and second phases of the EU ETS policy, most of them with the results of low 
policy efficiency. In a firm-level perspective of the EU ETS, Jaraite-Kažukauske 
and Di Maria (2016) use data of Lithuanian firms between 2003-2010, assessing 
the impact of the EU ETS on the environmental performance before and after the 
implementation. Their results show that the EU ETS participation did not lead to a 
reduction in CO₂ emissions. Although, a slight decrease in emission intensity was 
identified. Kotnik et al. (2014) investigates the effect of the emission price on 
greenhouse gas emissions from industrial processes in 19 EU countries. They find 
that an increase in carbon price by 1 euro results in a 0,014 ton decrease in emissions 
per year in industrial processes. In a Swedish perspective of EU ETS evaluation, 
Sandoff and Schaad (2009) also assess the first trading period of the policy, 
examining the experiences of the actors in the trading sector of the at the time 
recently implemented ETS policy. Their study is based on a survey which gives an 
account of the attitudes and actions of the companies included in the Swedish 
emissions trading sector. The study reveals that Swedish companies show 
significant interest in reducing emissions, but without any close attention to the 
pricing mechanism of the market-based instruments (ibid). This could be an 
indicator of low efficiency of the trading system, which is a frequently stated result 
from assessments of the early EU ETS phases.  
 
The ETS policy has also been implemented in other geographical regions than 
Europe, and these has also been assessed in various ways by previous works. In an 
Asian perspective of the ETS, Zhang et al. (2020) is evaluating the effect and 
efficiency of the ETS in reducing carbon emissions and the impact on economic 
growth in China, since its implementation in 2013. They carry out this assessment 
by applying a difference-in-difference method and a data envelopment analysis to 
evaluate the operating efficiency of the carbon emission trade market. The results 
showed that the ETS significantly reduced the emissions of industrial CO₂ in all 
emission trading pilots, and that the average emission intensity has decreased 
annually in China. 
 
Overall, a lot of previous research can be found about the ETS policy. However, 
surprisingly few are assessing the policy’s general effect on emissions. 
Furthermore, many studies are evaluating the impact of various factors’ effect on 
allowance prices, but not many are assessing the price effect on emissions. Also, 
many articles are dated and covers the early phases of the EU ETS. Since no 
consensus about the EU ETS price effect on emissions is yet established, this 
project can further contribute to the literature with updated knowledge in the 
subject, using new data. It will support the literature with additional information 
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about phase 2 and 3 of the EU ETS and how the policy has influenced CO₂ 
emissions of the Swedish industries, focusing on price effects. It can also contribute 
with further understandings of how the different sectors react to changes of carbon 
prices, which could indicate whether differences in policy efficiency are actual 
amongst industry sectors in Sweden. 
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This section will describe the theoretical framework of the thesis, an empirical 
motivation of chosen method, and a hypothesis. This is followed by a data 
description, presentation of any assumptions, and an explanation of the econometric 
model.  
3.1. Theoretical framework 
This study is following a supply and demand theory, as the EU ETS policy is built 
on an auctioning principle. The policy has created an emissions trading market for 
CO₂ allowances which entails supply and demand conditions, creating a 
corresponding price for carbon emissions (Aatola et al. 2013). The supply and 
demand create a relationship between the price that suppliers are willing to offer, 
and the price buyers are willing to accept when purchasing a good (Snyder & 
Nicholson 2017). Economist Alfred Marshal (1842-1924) showed that supply and 
demand simultaneously operate to determine the price, just like scissors has two 
blades making the cut. The price is therefore determined by the equilibrium 
between supply and demand. When the demand for allowances grows larger than 
the supply, the price of allowances will increase (Aatola et al. 2013). In the same 
sense the price will decrease if the demand is less than the supply. As the allowance 
market works in an equilibrium model the price is determined by the occasional 





Figure 2 Market based system with inelastic supply. Source: Own processing 2021. 
 
The level of supply of EU ETS allowances in the market is determined by 
policymakers as they decide the cap of allowed emissions (Figure 2). If the cap is 
lowered, the supply of allowances decrease, which entails a higher price. Also, the 
level of demand determines the price, if the demand of allowances is increased the 
price will also increase. 
 
The price of allowances itself has an influence on purchasers (Aatola et al. 2013). 
If the price of allowances is lower than the cost of adjusting the production to emit 
less, the producers will choose to buy allowances instead of changing their 
production to be more environmentally friendly. At the point where the price of 
allowances exceeds the cost of making the green adjustment of production, the 
producers will choose to cut their emissions. Although, under the assumption that 
firms protect themselves against uncertain and volatile permit prices, they will also 
engage in forward trading. This is to administer their scope so that decisions 
involving abatements and productions can be made with regards to the expected 
value of the forward price of an allowance (ibid).  
3.2. Empirical motivation & Hypothesis 
There are various sorts of econometric models that can be used to assess how 
independent variables affect a dependent variable (Stock & Watson 2007). 
According to Zang and Wei (2010), statistical analyses such as multivariate linear 
regression models are often used when evaluating causes and effects of the pricing 
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mechanism of the EU ETS. Also, Green (2021) reviews previously published EU 
ETS articles and lists several works where panel regression analysis is applied. 
Many have used this method to evaluate the impact of combustion in different 
industry sectors on emission allowance prices in various European countries. It has 
also been applied when assessing socio-economic effects (ibid). For instance, 
Chevalier et al. (2009) uses a multivariate linear regression analysis to shed light 
on any relations between macro-economic variables and the carbon market. 
Alberola et al. (2008) also uses a multivariate linear regression method to 
empirically study the interaction between the EU ETS carbon- and energy prices 
and shows that outside temperature had a significant effect on the carbon price 
during the first EU ETS time-period. 
 
This project will use a panel regression analysis to investigate how the emissions 
of various Swedish industries are affected by the price of emissions. Since previous 
studies prove relevance of the use of regression analyses when evaluating various 
factors’ effects on a variable, this is most likely an efficient instrument to answer 
the research question of this thesis. In this project, it is probable that the results will 
show a significant negative effect of allowance prices on emissions. This hypothesis 
is based on the observation of last years’ negative trend of emissions related to the 
last years’ positive trend of prices (Figure 1). 
3.3. Data description 
The data used is a panel data covering the period 2008-2020, limited to six Swedish 
industries, where the quantity of industry emissions is the dependent variable in 
terms of the logarithm of tons of CO₂ equivalents. The data of emissions from the 
various sectors was collected from the European Environment Agency, EEA 
(2021). The dataset originally included 18 industry activities for producing and 
manufacturing raw materials and goods in factories. From this initial dataset 4 
activities were excluded due to a lack of complete data for the selected time-period. 
The remaining 14 activities has then been combined and regrouped into 6 higher-
level sector groupings, with support from Table 6-3 in the EEA ETC/CME Working 




2. Iron & Steel 
3. Non-metallic minerals 
4. Pulp & Paper 
5. Chemicals 
6. Electricity & Other combustion 
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The data of allowance-prices was collected from Ember (2021) and covered weekly 
spot-price data of EU ETS Allowances in euros. This was manually adjusted into 
yearly mean prices. 
 
Data of the Industrial production index (IPI) was collected from Statistics Sweden, 
SCB (2021). This dataset measures the real output of the industries and show the 
levels of production and capacity as a chain index, 2015=100, by industrial 
classification of NACE Rev. 2. The dataset is day- and seasonally adjusted and has 
manually been changed from monthly index to yearly index by calculating the 
yearly mean. This adjustment makes the base year of 2015 in some sectors take a 
marginally different value than 100. To enable a panel-regression analysis 
including variables of both emissions and production, a matching of the industry 
sectors of the EEA and the NACE Rev. 2 was necessary. This was done by 
comparing the Detailed Structure-tables of NACE Rev. 2 with Table 6-3 in the EEA 
ETC/CME Working Paper.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables 




Index 100.29     76.88     141.88 
TotEmissions Total GHG-
emissions   
Ton of CO₂-
equivalents 









of Ton of 
CO₂-
equivalents 
6.22    4.75    7.01 
NewSectorID Group variable, industry 
sectors: 
1 – Refineries 
2 – Iron & Steel 
3 – Non-metallic Minerals 
4 – Pulp & Paper 
5 – Chemicals 
6 – Electricity & Other 
Combustion   
3.5     1 6 
Year Time 
variable 
Years 2014 2008        2020 
23 
 




EUR/ton 12.89     4.46     24.89 
LogPrice Logarithm of 






1.04     0.65    1.40 
 
To investigate whether the dataset contains stochastic trends or random walks, unit-
root tests will be applied (Bai & Carrion-I-Silvestre 2009). The presence of unit 
roots in the data are not optimal when doing a regression analysis. The unit roots 
are stochastic variations in the trends of the dataset, which may negatively influence 
the outcome of the estimated model and cause inaccuracy of the results. The 
variables in this project will be tested with the Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test, a test 
especially appropriate for panel data, to evaluate if the data is stationary or contains 
unit-roots (Levin et al. 2002). The tests will be implemented to verify if the trending 
data should need to be differenced or regressed on determinative functions of time 
to make the data stationary. Due to the timeframe, implementation of such means 
will not be possible within the scope of this thesis. This is a possible weakness of 
the study which must be considered when analyzing the results. The results of these 
tests will be shown in Appendix 2 and briefly mentioned in the Results part of this 
thesis. 
3.4. Assumptions  
The production-index data covers all production in Sweden. However, not all 
producers in Sweden are included in the EU ETS policy. Although, since the chosen 
industries are considered as emission intensive industries (Brännlund & Lundgren 
2010), an assumption has been made that the production data is covered by the EU 
ETS policy. This was done to enable an inclusion of a production variable in the 
model, as unitary production data among the industries cannot be elsewhere found 
and cannot manually be generated within the scope of this project. This assumption 
however brings a possibility of bias to the results and is to be considered a weakness 
of the study. 
 
Due to the lack of availability of lower-level subsector data in the collected NACE 
Rev. 2 production data, usage of higher-level sector production data was necessary 
to enable an analysis. The lack of sophisticated data made it required to manually 
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match the EEA-sectors’ data with the NACE Rev. 2-sectors’ data, which brought 
this study to making some assumptions. The production data sometimes included 
additional subsectors that the emissions data of EEA is not presenting. The EEA 
activities “Metal ore roasting or sintering”, “Production of pig iron or steel” and 
“Production or processing of ferrous metals” are, according to the EEA ETC/CME 
Working Paper, subgroups of “Iron & Steel”. This was therefore matched with the 
NACE Rev. 2 sector “Mining and Quarrying”, due to its prominent contents being 
Iron & Steel production. However, other production-subsectors such as coal, lignite 
and other mining or quarrying sectors are also included in the “Mining & 
Quarrying” section. This is a weakness of the study, and the results should by that 
be analyzed with caution due to potential underlying bias. Similar assumptions have 
been made with the remaining sectors. The EEA activities “Production of cement 
clinker”, “Production of lime, or calcination of dolomite/magnesite”, “Manufacture 
of glass”, “Manufacture of ceramics”, “Manufacture of mineral wool” and 
“Production or processing of gypsum or plasterboard” are according to the EEA 
ETC/CME Working Paper subgroups of the “Non-metallic minerals”-sector. This 
was therefore matched with the “Industry for other non-metallic minerals”-section 
of NACE Rev. 2. “Refining of mineral oil” is a subgroup to the “Refineries”-sector 
and was matched with the NACE rev. 2 section of “Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products”. The EEA activities “Production of pulp” and “Production of 
paper or cardboard” are subgroups of “Pulp & Paper”. This was matched with the 
production data of “Industry for pulp, paper and paperboard”. The EEA activity 
“Production of carbon black” is a subgroup to the “Chemicals”-sector and was 
matched with the production data of “Industry for chemical, chemical products and 
pharmaceutical products”. The EEA activity “Combustion of fuels” is, according 
to the EEA ETC/CME Working Paper, mainly covering electricity production, plus 
various manufacturing industries. Therefore, this has been matched with the 
“Electricity, gas, steam and hot water plants” production data.  
3.5. Econometric model 
This project will apply a panel regression analysis in its assessment. The model will 
evaluate the effect of the EU ETS carbon price on emissions of Swedish industries. 
It will do this by including an independent variable of the EU ETS carbon price in 
the model, with industrial emissions as the dependent variable. However, there may 
possibly exist additional factors affecting emissions of Swedish industries. One 
likely factor is the volume of production in each sector. It is possible that the size 
of emissions is in positive correlation with the size of industrial production. To 
account for this possible correlation in the analysis, a variable for industrial 
production output will be included in the model. It could be considered that the 
variable for production acts as a control variable for several possible factors 
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influencing the emissions, whilst primarily affecting the level of production. This 
could for instance be market related shocks such as the 2008 financial crisis or the 
2020 Covid-19 crisis, or general fluctuation of market prices or demands. It could 
also correct for the link between outside temperature and emission prices shown by 
Alberola et al. (2008), since outside temperature probably affects the output 
quantity of production in the energy market. No other control variable can be 
considered or included in the model within the scope of this study, which is a 
weakness of the study, and may entail omitted variable bias.  
 
The econometric equation is specified as:  
 
logYit = α + β₁logX₁t + β₂X₂it + β₃X₃t + β₄X₄i + ε 
 
Where Y is the total emissions, α is the constant, X₁ is the allowance-price, X₂ is 
the production index, X₃ a dummy variable for Year, and X₄ a dummy variable for 
Sectors. The variables Year and Sectors were tested as dummies in the model and 
the presence did change the coefficients and improve the significance of all 
variables in the model. The inclusion of the dummies also increased the R² value, 
as well did the inclusion of both variables Production and Price, whereas all 4 
variables were considered valuable for a good model fit. As noted, the model will 
use the logarithm of total emissions and the logarithm of prices. The use of 
logarithmic variables in both left- and right-hand side is useful when interpreting 
the coefficients (Benoit 2011). This log-log relationship enables a clear explanation 
that when variable X₁ increases with 1%, the Y variable changes with β₁%. The 
coefficient of a logarithmic variable in a log-log relationship is commonly referred 
to as an elasticity. Since the variable for Production is an index of industrial 
production output, it will not be made logarithmic. 
 
Econometric models are commonly used when applying panel data, two of them 
being the Fixed effects model and the Random effects model (Stock & Watson 
2007). The Random effects model, unlike the Fixed effects model, assumes the 
variation across entities is random and uncorrelated with other independent 
variables in the model. Different tests can be applied to decide whether random 
effects model or fixed effects model is better applied. This project will perform a 
Hausman test to determine whether Random or Fixed effects model should be used.  
 
When assessing a panel data, which includes a time aspect, it is essential to apply 
de-trended stationary data (Stock & Watson 2007). Otherwise, the variance and the 
mean will also increase, since the data in the series is constantly growing over time. 
The index of production in this model is seasonally adjusted and de-trended, yet the 
variables of price and emissions are not. However, these variables are made 
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logarithmic in the model, which could contribute to de-trending the data. A 
measurement of stationary or non-stationary datasets is a homoscedasticity test, 
where homoscedasticity is a state with continuous residual variance throughout the 
dataset (Stock & Watson 2007). Although the applied price- and emissions data in 
this project is made logarithmic, they cannot with any confidence be considered 
homoscedastic. Heteroscedasticity is a state where the variance of the variables is 
non-constant throughout the dataset. Such occurrence could affect the accuracy of 
the model and should be controlled for. The model in this project will be tested for 
heteroscedasticity with a Breusch-Pagan test. If the test is shown to be significant, 
the null hypothesis is rejected, which indicates that heteroscedasticity is present and 
the model is not reliable. If this would be the case, Robust Standard Errors will be 
applied to correct for any heteroscedasticity. 
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This section presents the results from the completed tests and the applied 
econometric model. 
 
Table 2 Correlation between variables 
 Production TotEmissions LogTotEmissions NewSectorID Year Price 
Production 1.00      
TotEmissions -0.18    1.00     
LogTotEmissions -0.20    0.83    1.00    
NewSectorID -0.02    0.18   -0.26    1.00   
Year 0.47   -0.05   -0.03    0.00    1.00   
Price 0.15   -0.02    0.00   -0.00    0.13    1.00  
LogPrice 0.10   -0.02    0.01    0.00    0.04    0.98    
 
Table 2 shows the correlation between variables. The correlation can fall between 
-1 and 1 which indicates maximum linear dependences, while a value of 0 indicates 
independence between the variables (Stock & Watson 2007). The logarithmic 
variables show a large correlation with their original variables, which is not 
unexpected. The remaining variables does not show high correlation amongst each 
other, the highest value being 0.47 between Year and Production, indicating that 
when years passes the production overall in some extent also increases. 
 
The Levin-Lin-Chu tests in Appendix 2 investigates the occurrence of unit roots in 
the datasets of the different variables. The tests indicate existence of unit roots in 
the variables of Price and Emissions, but not for the variable of industrial 
production output. This implies that the data in the variables of price and emissions 
are non-stationary and could contain stochastic trends or random walks, which may 
lower the credibility of the results.  
 
The Breusch-Pagan test in Appendix 3 shows a chi-2 test for occurrence of 
heteroskedasticity in the model. The results indicate the test to be significant, a 
result saying that heteroskedasticity is present. This result entails that Robust SE 
will be applied in the regression model to control for heteroskedasticity, which will 




Table 3 Hausman test for Random versus Fixed model 










LogPrice -12.73 -12.73 -1.58e-09 3.53e-05 
Production 0.0026 0.0026 1.27e-13 3.00e-09 
Year     
2009   -3.16 -3.16 -3.91e-10 8.73e-06 
2010   -2.83 -2.83 -3.62e-10 8.06e-06 
2011   -3.63 -3.63 -4.55e-10 1.01e-05  
2012   -6.62 -6.62 -8.23e-10 1.84e-05  
2013   -9.40 -9.40 -1.17e-09 2.6e-05 
2014   -7.76 -7.76 -9.63e-10 2.15e-05 
2015   -6.39 -6.39 -7.93e-10 1.77e-05 
2016   -8.39 -8.39 -1.04e-09 2.32e-05 
2017   -7.91 -7.91 -9.83e-10 2.19e-05 
2018   -2.22 -2.22 -2.77e-10 6.17e-06 
2019   0.09 0.09 1.24e-11 2.76e-07 
Prob>chi2   1.00    
 
The Hausman test presented in table 7 analyses the differences between the 
coefficients of the Fixed effects and the Random effects models. If the differences 
of coefficients are systematic the null hypothesis will be rejected, and the Fixed 
Effects model is a better model fit for the dataset. In this case the results show a p-
value of 1.00 which indicates that the test is insignificant and the differences in 
coefficients are not systematic. This result suggests that the Random effects model 
is better fitted for this dataset, which will be pursued in the regression analysis. 
 






LogPrice -12.73*** 4.25 0.003 
Production 0.0026** 0.0011 0.016 
Year    
2009   -3.16*** 1.01 0.002 
2010   -2.83*** 0.95 0.003 
2011 -3.63*** 1.21 0.003 
2012 -6.62*** 2.20 0.003 
2013 -9.40*** 3.12 0.003 
2014 -7.76*** 2.59 0.003 
2015 -6.39*** 2.14 0.003 
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2016 -8.39*** 2.80 0.003 
2017 -7.91*** 2.64 0.003 
2018 -2.22*** 0.73 0.003 
2019 0.09** 0.05 0.037 
2020 0 (omitted)  
NewSectorID    
2 0.19*** 0.01 0.000 
3 0.06*** 0.00 0.000 
4 -0.52*** 0.00 0.000 
5 -1.55*** 0.01 0.000 
6 0.45*** 0.00 0.000 
    
cons 23.84*** 5.83 0.000 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the Random effects panel regression analysis. The 
results show that all included variables are at 1% level of significance, aside from 
the variable of Production which is significant at 5% level. The logarithmic variable 
for price has a coefficient of -12.73 which implies that 1% increase in price is 
associated with a 12.73% decrease in emissions. The coefficient for Production is 
0.0026. As the production variable in this case is an Index variable, which tells the 
percentage change of production related to a base year, it should be interpreted as 
any logarithmic independent variable in a log-log relationship. Therefore, the 
results indicate that for a 1% increase in production there will be a 0.0026% increase 
in emissions. The variables of Year and NewSectorID are non-logarithmic 
dummies. The results of these variables, being in a log-linear situation, need some 
adjustment before making interpretation. However, these coefficients will not be 
considered in this study since the different industries’ portions of the total emissions 
can be graphically displayed from historical data. Such data is presented in Figure 









In this section the results of the thesis will be discussed, along with a graphical 
analysis of illustrated data of EU ETS allowance prices, EU ETS emissions, and 
industrial production output. This will be put in relation to the reforms of the policy, 
to analyze the policy’s effect on Swedish industrial emission reductions, as well as 
on any changes of the industries’ production turning more environmentally 
friendly. 
 
This thesis has measured the effect of the EU ETS carbon price on emissions of 
Swedish Industries. The findings may help understand sector-specific effects of the 
EU ETS carbon price and thus contribute to further knowledge about favorable 
sector-specific adjustments for increased policy efficiency. This could help 
improving the emission reductions, which would support reaching the goal of the 
Paris agreement.  
5.1. Analysis of econometric results 
The variables in the model all had high significances which indicate that they affect 
the emissions. The variables of price and emissions are non-stationary according to 
the unit-root tests. This is not surprising since both variables probably include 
random walks or trends due to external effects. Random happenings such as the 
economic crisis in 2008, the covid-19 crisis in 2020 or other market related 
fluctuations affecting the sectors probably have an impact on the Swedish 
industries. Nevertheless, the presence of unit-roots and heteroskedasticity may 
affect the accuracy of the estimated results. Also, the coefficients from the results 
of a random effects panel regression can be somewhat difficult to interpret since 
they include both within-entity and between-entity effects, having a weighted 
average of within and between estimators. This is important to have in mind when 
evaluating the results, knowing that the estimated coefficients may not be directly 
applicable to each sector. The different designs of the EU ETS phases could also 
affect the accuracy of the result due to structural breaks, making historical values 




the allowance trading market was not fully developed, which entails differences in 
market effects and price changes over time, and in the industries’ reactions to such 
changes.  
 
The coefficient of price declares that a 1% increase in price makes a 12,73% 
decrease in emissions. This variable is highly significant which confirms the stated 
hypothesis of this thesis; allowance-prices are having a negative effect on 
emissions. This is in line with previous research of the EU ETS (Kotnik et al. 2014; 
Haites 2018; Murray and Maniloff 2015). However, the coefficient value of 12,73 
is considerably high compared to previous literature. For example, Kotnik et al. 
(2014) finds that an increase in carbon price by 1 euro results in a 0,014 ton decrease 
in emissions per year in industrial processes. When comparing the results of this 
thesis with Kotnik et al. (2014) it is favorable to adjust the units to similar units as 
theirs. As the yearly mean price in this thesis is 12,89 euro, a 1% price increase 
would equal an increase of 0,1289 euros per ton CO₂. The yearly mean of total 
emissions in this thesis is 3 179 340 ton CO₂-equivalents. A 12,73% decrease in 
emissions would then equal a decrease of 404 730 ton CO₂-equivalents. Therefore, 
the results of this thesis suggests that an average yearly increase in price of 0,1289 
euro per ton is associated with an average yearly emissions decrease of 404 730 ton 
CO₂-equivalents. Evidently, Kotnik et al.’s (2014) estimated value is considerably 
smaller, and although a negative relationship is likely, the size of the estimated 
price-effect in this thesis is questionable. A likely explanation of the high estimate 
of price is the possibility of omitted variable bias in the model. Factors such as 
offshoring, emission-abatement costs, or other environmental policies could have 
large impacts on the emissions of Swedish industries. Sweden has ambitious 
environmental goals compared to other countries taking part of the EU ETS, 
meaning that additional policies, environmental goals, and measures for attaining 
emission abatements have been implemented in the Swedish economy lately 
(Naturvårdsverket 2020). This could have had a contributing part in the decreased 
emissions in Sweden and the exclusion of such important variables from the model 
have probably caused biased results in this thesis. Furthermore, it is questionable if 
industries really are quick adjusters of production processes, and whether they are 
agile enough to be able to respond to price changes simultaneously as the changes 
occurs. It is probable that some industries during previous years proactively have 
ventured for a more sustainable production to become more environmentally 
friendly, even before any substantial price increase, enabling simultaneously 
reduced emissions. Such possible venturing could be caused by several reasons, 
such as previous supports for environmentally friendly investments, cost 
fluctuations of abatement measures through time, or the producers’ estimations of 
future policy changes. The allowance price itself could then perhaps not be 
considered the only causal factor of the decreased emissions in Sweden, even 
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though there is a statistically significant price effect showed by the results of this 
thesis. As Bayer and Aklin (2020) state, the EU ETS has been effective even during 
times of low allowance prices. Similarly, Haites (2018), and Murray and Maniloff 
(2015) argues that the price effect of the EU ETS allowances is significant, but that 
the policy has been more effective than simple price-controlling policies such as 
carbon taxes. This confirms a probability of additional dimensions within the 
policy, other than price effects, causing emission reductions. In future research, the 
eventuality of such additional causal effects of the EU ETS, and the eventuality of 
additional factors affecting industrial emissions, needs to be considered and further 
evaluated to obtain more reliable results. 
5.2. Co-movement between Emissions, Allowances 
and Price  
This section will assess whether the rapid price increase following 2017 is due to 




Figure 2 shows the allocated allowances in Sweden since the implementation of the 
EU ETS. It also shows all verified emissions from industries covered by the EU 
ETS in Sweden. The yellow line presents the fluctuations in allowance-price over 













































Figure 3 Allocated emissions and allowances in Sweden. Yearly average price changes. 
Source: Own processing 2021. Based on data from EEA 2021, Ember 2021. 
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fluctuations following year 2008 most likely reflecting the effects of the financial 
crisis. The drop in price following 2008 may also reflect the financial crisis, 
lowering the demand of allowances in some sectors. It could also reflect the EU 
ETS reform in 2008, making the policy more transparent whereas a large surplus 
of allowances in the market became visible. Such noted market-based relationships 
of price fluctuations are in accordance with the theory of supply and demand 
presented by Snyder and Nicholson (2017). The emissions appear to remain 
relatively stable between 2013 and 2018 where it then subsequently decreases. The 
allowances show a rapid increase in 2013, which is a result of the policy reform 
entering phase 3. The market then progressively became more transparent, and the 
auctioning principle was more thoroughly applied, which enabled the policy to 
attain more of a genuine market context. The emissions-cap was gradually lowered 
throughout phase 3 and a clear decrease is observed after 2017, turning even more 
distinct after 2018. The rapidly increasing allowance price after 2017 reflects this 
lowered level of allowances, a relationship indicating that the auctioning principle 
of the policy sets in. This reaction is in line with Hepburn’s (2006) statement of 
symmetry between regulation of quantities and prices, as the use of quantity 
instruments always entails a related indirect price. It also agrees with the supply 
and demand theory described by Snyder and Nicholson (2017), stating that lowered 
levels of supply entail an increased price. Hence, it is probable that the auctioning 
principle of the EU ETS and the supply levels of allowances decides the allowance 
price. 
5.3. Sector-level differences 
This section will graphically analyze and discuss any differences between the 
Swedish sectors regarding emissions and the year-by-year co-movements of 
emissions and industrial production output. Sector-level emissions over time are 





Figure 4 Swedish industrial emissions from different sectors. EUA price. Source: Own 
processing 2021. Based on data from EEA 2021, Ember 2021. 
 
Large overall fluctuations in emissions can be observed after the financial crisis 
2008, where the sector of Iron & Steel has a substantial part of the changes in 
emissions (Figure 4). The levels of emissions in the industries then remained rather 
stable between years 2013 and 2017. Various changes can be observed after year 
2017 when the price rapidly increased. The overall emissions decreased after that 
point, where all sectors took part of this reduction, except for the Iron & Steel sector 
where the emissions instead increased.  
 
An important objective of an environmental policy is to induce lowered emissions 
without a decrease in industrial production output, since the global emissions must 
be lowered whilst not hindering economic growth (European Parliament 2015). If 
industries can enable more production and less emissions, they are considered as 
less emission intensive, and thus more environmentally friendly in their production. 
The different sectors’ emissions and production outputs are illustrated in Figure 5 









































Sector level emissions, Sweden
Refineries Iron & Steel
Non-metallic minerals Pulp and paper


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Electricity & Other Combustion
Production Emissions
Figure 8 Production and emissions of Pulp & 
Paper. Source: Own processing 2021. Based on 
data from SCB 2021, EEA 2021. 
Figure 5 Production and emissions of Refineries. 
Source: Own processing 2021. Based on data 
from SCB 2021, EEA 2021. 
Figure 6 Production and emissions of Iron & 
Steel. Source: Own processing 2021. Based on 
data from SCB 2021, EEA 2021. 
Figure 7 Production and emissions of Non-
metallic minerals. Source: Own processing 2021. 
Based on data from SCB 2021, EEA 2021. 
Figure 9 Production and emissions of Chemicals. 
Source: Own processing 2021. Based on data from 
SCB 2021, EEA 2021. 
Figure 10 Production and emissions of Electricity 
& Other combustion. Source: Own processing 
2021. Based on data from SCB 2021, EEA 2021. 
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The occurrence of an overall increased environmentally friendly production is 
indicated by the negative correlation between Production and Emissions in Table 
2. The correlation of -0,20 is not high, but it is a negative correlation, indicating 
that for an overall increasing production, emissions decrease. This is notably visible 
in Figure 8, presenting the Pulp and Paper sector, which shows that the emissions 
were initially high but then decreased over time although production output is held 
relatively constant. Similar developments can be observed in most sectors. The 
Electricity and Other combustion sector presented in Figure 10 shows that the level 
of production appears to be kept relatively consistent, and over time indicates a 
slightly increasing trend. In contrast, the emissions show a rapid drop after year 
2018, a relationship indicating that the emitted CO₂ per produced output has 
decreased in the Electricity- and Other combustion sector. This is a signal that the 
policy is being effective and that the price increase after 2017 enhanced incentives 
to adapt less emission intensive methods in the production. The Non-metallic 
minerals sector in Figure 7 indicates this pattern as well, where the trends of 
emissions and production tends to correlate throughout time, until year 2018 where 
the emissions started decreasing despite production being held constant. The 
Chemical-sector in figure 9 is also showing a break of pattern after year 2018. The 
production is seemingly held constant until 2018 where it then shows a rapid 
increase. The emissions of this sector show an overall increasing trend after 2013 
until 2019, where it then rapidly drops year 2020 even though production is 
increasing, a reaction indicating that the emission intensity is lowered. The 
Refineries sector in figure 5 show a large drop in emissions after 2018, although 
also a large drop in production. However, the year of 2020 is showing a recovery 
of production, whilst the emissions keep decreasing. This is also indicating a 
decreased emission intensity, implying that a more environmentally friendly 
production is achieved.   
 
The pattern of a more environmentally friendly production after year 2018 is 
demonstrated by all sectors in this thesis except for the Iron & Steel sector, 
presented in figure 6. Furthermore, the industry of iron and steel is the only one not 
showing a decrease in emissions after 2018. This is an important actuality since it 
might indicate a lack of policy efficiency concerning this specific industry sector. 
In contrast, there is a distinctive response from the Electricity & Other combustion 
sector, which indicates a large policy efficiency. Perhaps the various sectors need 
to be approached differently due to their different preconditions, characteristics, 
and circumstances of production. As Aatola et al. (2013) argues, the producers will 
not choose to cut emissions until the point where the allowance price exceeds the 
costs of making green adjustments. This argument tells me that the Iron & Steel 
sector probably faces higher abatement costs than for instance the sector of 
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Electricity & Other combustion, a possible actuality causing the differences of 
policy efficiency among the sectors.  
 
Considering that all sectors except one are showing similar changes in patterns after 
year 2018, when a rapid price increase simultaneously occurred, it is likely that the 
allowance price is having an effect on the lowered emission intensity. This is 
supported by the statistically significant variable of price in the results of this 
thesis’s econometric model. It also agrees with the findings of Jaraité-Kažukauske 
and Di Maria (2016), who noticed a lowered emission intensity among industries 
due to the EU ETS. However, the price effect on the emission intensity has not been 
statistically tested in this thesis, neither has actual ratios of emissions per production 
output been calculated and assessed. Other factors of the policy than the allowance 
price could have an effect on emission reductions or increased environmentally 
friendly production, as Bayer and Aklin (2020), Haites (2018) and Murray and 
Maniloff (2015) show. Such additional factors have not been considered in this 








The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of the EU ETS allowance price 
on emissions of different industries in Sweden. This has been done by assessing the 
price effect of allowance prices on emissions, using a random effects regression 
analysis. All variables in the model were shown to have a statistically significant 
influence on emissions, where price has a negative effect on emissions, and the 
output of production has a positive effect on emissions. The coefficient for price 
was shown to be relatively high; a 12,74% overall decrease in emissions for a 1% 
increase in price. This large estimate is likely due to underlying bias from the 
limitations within the dataset and the model. Other factors and circumstances not 
included in this analysis may have an impact on emission reductions of Swedish 
EU ETS industries. Consequently, more research about additional contributing 
factors of emission reductions is needed. Nevertheless, the results of this thesis are 
making relevant contributions to the scientific debate. The findings of a significant 
negative effect of the EU ETS allowance price on industrial emissions are 
contributing to the discussion about price effects in this field of study, where no 
consensus have yet been reached. 
 
The graphical year-by-year analysis of the emissions and the co-movements of 
emissions and industrial production outputs reveals heterogeneity between industry 
sectors. These findings specifically acknowledges that the Iron & Steel industry 
does not seem to be affected by the changes of the EU ETS allowance price. All 
other sectors show decreased emissions after 2017 when a rapid price increase 
occurred, and also appears to carry a less emission intensive production since then. 
These findings suggest that most Swedish industries are becoming more 
environmentally friendly due to the policy, but that there are differences in how 
well the policy perform in the various sectors. The findings of such differences in 
policy efficiency between sectors could significantly contribute to and be of 
relevance for policy makers. More comprehensive research is needed to evaluate 
these sector-specific differences, as well as further discussions about possible 
favorable sector-specific adjustments of the EU ETS, which could help reach an 
overall increase in policy efficiency. Such increased policy efficiency could help 
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LogTotemissions NewSector NewSectorID Price LogPrice 
2008 105,1417 3018116 105,3351 6,479736 Refineries 1 24,07 1,381476 
2009 102,5667 2939159 102,5795 6,468223 Refineries 1 13,78 1,139249 
2010 100,325 2957670 103,2255 6,47095 Refineries 1 14,41 1,158664 
2011 98,425 2847035 99,36424 6,454393 Refineries 1 12,59 1,100026 
2012 104,4833 3023274 105,5152 6,480478 Refineries 1 7,36 0,866878 
2013 91,525 2596336 90,61461 6,414361 Refineries 1 4,457411 0,649083 
2014 96,39167 2786094 97,23735 6,444996 Refineries 1 6,002972 0,778366 
2015 102,0917 2865251 100 6,457163 Refineries 1 7,69351 0,886125 
2016 95,78333 2637710 92,0586 6,421227 Refineries 1 5,353721 0,728656 
2017 102,2167 2745232 95,81122 6,438579 Refineries 1 5,83724 0,766208 
2018 108,15 2875171 100,3462 6,458664 Refineries 1 16,34051 1,213266 
2019 76,95 2281280 79,61885 6,358179 Refineries 1 24,8878 1,395986 
2020 96,05 2172035 75,8061 6,336867 Refineries 1 24,80441 1,394529 
2008 79,275 4999042 114,2059 6,698887 Iron and 
Steel 
2 24,07 1,381476 
2009 76,875 2847030 65,042 6,454392 Iron and 
Steel 
2 13,78 1,139249 
2010 97,49167 5073654 115,9105 6,705321 Iron and 
Steel 
2 14,41 1,158664 
2011 101,3667 4974667 113,6491 6,696764 Iron and 
Steel 
2 12,59 1,100026 
2012 100,75 3925106 89,67125 6,593851 Iron and 
Steel 
2 7,36 0,866878 
2013 98,59167 4053727 92,60967 6,607854 Iron and 
Steel 
2 4,457411 0,649083 
2014 101,5 4115323 94,01686 6,614404 Iron and 
Steel 
2 6,002972 0,778366 
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2015 99,20833 4377218 100 6,641198 Iron and 
Steel 
2 7,69351 0,886125 
2016 112,325 4399098 100,4999 6,643364 Iron and 
Steel 
2 5,353721 0,728656 
2017 121,2417 4275433 97,67466 6,63098 Iron and 
Steel 
2 5,83724 0,766208 
2018 115,5667 3900477 89,10858 6,591118 Iron and 
Steel 
2 16,34051 1,213266 
2019 116,375 5162189 117,9331 6,712834 Iron and 
Steel 
2 24,8878 1,395986 
2020 115,925 5813576 132,8144 6,764443 Iron and 
Steel 
2 24,80441 1,394529 
2008 107,2833 3416644 105,5192 6,5336 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 24,07 1,381476 
2009 83,95833 2895841 89,43478 6,461775 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 13,78 1,139249 
2010 85,84167 3236037 99,94135 6,510013 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 14,41 1,158664 
2011 97,2 3348443 103,4129 6,524843 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 12,59 1,100026 
2012 97,45 3367060 103,9878 6,527251 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 7,36 0,866878 
2013 92 3081168 95,1584 6,488715 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 4,457411 0,649083 
2014 98,25 3046083 94,07484 6,483742 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 6,002972 0,778366 
2015 100,4667 3237936 100 6,510268 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 7,69351 0,886125 
2016 102,0333 3250524 100,3888 6,511953 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 5,353721 0,728656 
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2017 103,6417 3240855 100,0902 6,51066 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 5,83724 0,766208 
2018 106,725 3272031 101,053 6,514817 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 16,34051 1,213266 
2019 106,0417 2850551 88,03605 6,454929 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 24,8878 1,395986 
2020 105,7417 2715348 83,86046 6,433825 Non-
metallic 
minerals 
3 24,80441 1,394529 
2008 101,325 1310964 203,7896 6,117591 Pulp and 
paper 
4 24,07 1,381476 
2009 95,43333 1118356 173,8486 6,04858 Pulp and 
paper 
4 13,78 1,139249 
2010 102,0833 1166424 181,3208 6,066856 Pulp and 
paper 
4 14,41 1,158664 
2011 100,2167 1003083 155,9294 6,001337 Pulp and 
paper 
4 12,59 1,100026 
2012 99,33333 943184 146,6181 5,974596 Pulp and 
paper 
4 7,36 0,866878 
2013 97,825 836819 130,0836 5,922632 Pulp and 
paper 
4 4,457411 0,649083 
2014 96,475 675928 105,0731 5,8299 Pulp and 
paper 
4 6,002972 0,778366 
2015 100,3917 643293 100 5,808409 Pulp and 
paper 
4 7,69351 0,886125 
2016 101,7 701968 109,121 5,846317 Pulp and 
paper 
4 5,353721 0,728656 
2017 105,3917 707186 109,9322 5,849534 Pulp and 
paper 
4 5,83724 0,766208 
2018 104,2167 787218 122,3732 5,896095 Pulp and 
paper 
4 16,34051 1,213266 
2019 102,1083 696323 108,2435 5,842811 Pulp and 
paper 
4 24,8878 1,395986 
2020 100,075 616606 95,8515 5,790008 Pulp and 
paper 
4 24,80441 1,394529 
2008 96,70833 92363 111,5105 4,965498 Chemicals 5 24,07 1,381476 
2009 91,21667 55979 67,58382 4,748025 Chemicals 5 13,78 1,139249 
2010 95,725 85647 103,4022 4,932712 Chemicals 5 14,41 1,158664 
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2011 106,5083 76123 91,9038 4,881516 Chemicals 5 12,59 1,100026 
2012 96,64167 76031 91,79273 4,880991 Chemicals 5 7,36 0,866878 
2013 109,1583 66885 80,7507 4,825329 Chemicals 5 4,457411 0,649083 
2014 106,45 76806 92,72839 4,885395 Chemicals 5 6,002972 0,778366 
2015 100,15 82829 100 4,918182 Chemicals 5 7,69351 0,886125 
2016 96,78333 79668 96,1837 4,901284 Chemicals 5 5,353721 0,728656 
2017 96,28333 93921 113,3914 4,972763 Chemicals 5 5,83724 0,766208 
2018 98,84167 90816 109,6428 4,958162 Chemicals 5 16,34051 1,213266 
2019 125,7833 100937 121,8619 5,00405 Chemicals 5 24,8878 1,395986 
2020 141,875 74108 89,47108 4,869865 Chemicals 5 24,80441 1,394529 
2008 91,21667 7231315 94,6535 6,859217 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 24,07 1,381476 
2009 84,125 7631025 99,88545 6,882583 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 13,78 1,139249 
2010 91,21667 10137260 132,6905 7,005921 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 14,41 1,158664 
2011 91,66667 7601811 99,50306 6,880917 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 12,59 1,100026 
2012 102,0083 6834517 89,45965 6,834708 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 7,36 0,866878 
2013 94,60833 9113110 119,285 6,959667 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 4,457411 0,649083 
2014 94,35 8198087 107,3079 6,913713 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 6,002972 0,778366 
2015 100,8583 7639776 100 6,883081 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 7,69351 0,886125 
2016 95,55833 8264494 108,1772 6,917216 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 5,353721 0,728656 
2017 100,15 8124800 106,3487 6,909813 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 5,83724 0,766208 
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2018 100,5917 8474800 110,93 6,928129 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 16,34051 1,213266 
2019 103,6 7233379 94,68051 6,859341 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 
6 24,8878 1,395986 
2020 100,925 4625242 60,54159 6,665134 Electricity 
and other 
combustion 




Appendix 2     
Unit-root test for Production. 
Levin-Lin-Chu test, Production 
  Statistic       p-value 
 Unadjusted t        -10.98 
 Adjusted t*          -4.52             0.00 
 
 
Unit-root test for LogPrice. 
Levin-Lin-Chu test, LogPrice 
                      Statistic p-value 
 Unadjusted t        -3.14 
 Adjusted t*          -1.59 0.06 
 
 
Unit-root test for LogTotemissions. 
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for LogTotemissions 
  Statistic p-value 
 Unadjusted t         -5.58 






Appendix 3     
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. 
Breusch-Pagan test 
chi2(18)  
Prob > chi2   
38.66 
0.0032 
 
